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1. Despite he did not write any full-fledged and comprehen-
sive treatise of the kind Thomas Jefferson, Walter Lippman, 
or John Rawls did, William James is among the great Ameri-
can liberal philosophers. As Ralph Waldo Emerson before 
him, and John Dewey and Richard Rorty after him, James 
was indeed highly skeptical of the opportunity of theorizing 
upon such matter – and much else –, mostly because of his 
wider distrust of top-down, idealized approaches in philo-
sophical and political matters alike. As a consequence, and 
consistently with the pragmatist line he was part of, through-
out his work we find a wealth of bottom-up, non-ideal in-
sights about how to picture and exercise this particular 
option. In what follows I shall briefly present James’s distinc-
tive understanding of liberalism, highlighting the two key 
features of it that in my opinion are still very much relevant 
for us today, placing them in some historical context: namely, 
the ethical feature of liberalism and its grounding in a con-
ception of the self as contingent and mobile. 
 
2. Like most, if not all concepts, philosophical and otherwise, 
liberalism meant different things to different people, and still 
do. That said, on a minimal and relatively uncontroversial 
understanding of it, liberalism has to do with liberty: with 
what liberty is and most importantly with what we might do 
with it. By taking liberty as one of our dearest human values, 
James was a liberal thinker through and through. Still, rather 
than defending liberty as a metaphysical feature of the world 
or of ourselves as part and parcel of it, James took liberty as 
something to build and care for midst our daily activities, 
hence furthering J.S. Mill’s practical (that is moral and politi-
cal) analysis and defense of such concept in his 1859 master-
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piece On Liberty. The metaphysical footing of liberty, if there 
is such a thing, was to be found in the ethical practices made 
possible and fostered by it: the “dilemma of determinism”, as 
James famously and forcefully claimed in his timely essay 
bearing that name, is truly an ethical one about which kind of 
universe would home our dearest moral concerns and trans-
actions (James 1978a). It is in fact a running theme of James’s 
pragmatist approach that of asking not so much how some-
thing can be conceived or justified from without our individ-
ual and communal lives, but rather how something can be 
achieved and reshaped from within them. Liberty – or free-
dom, James’s preferred term for it –, was such a thing, and 
centrally so: at once an ideal to pursue and a distinctive way 
of life to nurture through strokes of daily practice at pains of 
losing it and its benefits altogether. 
Differently from Mill, James did not dedicate one single 
work to articulating his view but rather scattered his reflec-
tions on the topic throughout his writings. If this makes it 
somewhat harder to guess the shape of his proposal, James 
opted for this impressionistic (at times Gestaltic) approach for 
a reason: given the centrality of freedom in human affairs, no 
single entry would suffice to shed proper light on it. A multi-
focused approach would then better serve the purpose, show-
ing its widespread presence and role in our lives and philos-
ophies. James’s psychological, philosophical, and religious 
writings are variously permeated by discussions of different 
aspects of this seminal notion. We Jamesians are to be very 
grateful to Sami Pihlström for his many efforts to put some 
order in this wealth of material, and for the resulting original 
interpretation of James as a philosopher of freedom and inde-
terminism1. It is indeed impossible, if not at the cost of glar-
ing oversights, to isolate and pick one thread without 
weighting its place within the wider context, which Pihlström 
carefully reconstructed and conveniently put to work to show 
the opportunity of a Jamesian worldview on such topics. 
Now, the very minimal unit one should take into considera-
tion when accounting for James’s master-notion, and this is 
what I shall be doing in this text, is the combo of 
metaphilosophical and ethical considerations at the heart of 
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 See, among his many publications, Pihlström 2008 and 2009. 
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his conception of freedom and hence of liberalism as it sur-
faces in some key moral writings. In so doing, I will briefly 
argue for the opportunity of giving practical and ethical con-
siderations about freedom primacy over metaphysical ones, 
engaging in this way – although only tangentially and at any 
rate only cursorily – Pihlström’s rich and sophisticated recon-
struction2. 
 
3. William James’s moral and political thought was remarka-
bly well adapted to its historical context, and in particular to 
the emergence, in the late nineteenth century, of a general-
ized culture of uncertainty, risk, and probability. That context 
has been ably charted by intellectual historians such as Ian 
Hacking, who depicted it as a pivotal moment within the 
broader trend of the formation of new psychological, episte-
mological, and political subjects and subjectivities as concep-
tualized by Michel Foucault in a number of by-now classical 
writings3. In the face of normalization, and counter to it, 
James developed a strenuous ethics rooted in a conception of 
liberty or freedom as self-transformation. Such an ethics re-
mains a valuable source of freedom today insofar as we re-
main bound to probability and uncertainty as an ongoing 
context for moral living4.  
By the end of the nineteenth century, in an era which wit-
nessed the painful yet liberating passage from a culture of 
certainty to one of probability, with the invention of insur-
ance companies and the scientific management of risk, chance 
became something which individuals and society as a whole 
simply could not ignore or circumvent. An entire new mind-
set suddenly broke into the lives and institutions across the 
Atlantic, making the world of fixities and certainties look 
outdated and more importantly frustrating. The old catego-
ries of – and reliance on – tradition, custom, and authority 
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 A sample of our disagreement has been given by Pihlström himself in 
his generous review of my work Pihlström 2015. 
3
 See Hacking 1990, which is very much indebted to Foucault’s 1970s writ-
ings on institutions, technologies, and biopower. For pragmatism as a 
revolution driven by the taking of chance and mobilization of things and 
persons seriously, see Menand 2001. 
4
 On this extremely rich context and James’s pivotal contribution to it, see 
Koopman 2016 and 2017, to which this section is indebted. 
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cast a dim light on the meanings, values, and truths people 
and nations lived by. What took place was a generalized-yet-
microscopic call for action in the face of uncertainty and in-
stability. Not only we witnessed radical changes in practices – 
epistemological, moral, and even religious –, but the very pic-
ture of rationality – theoretical as well practical – was turned 
upside down, with transaction replacing mirroring as the 
privileged model of, and metaphor for, sound thinking, 
speaking, and acting.  
Now, fascinating as it is, this is not material for historians 
of philosophy and culture only, as our contemporary world is 
still very much indebted to, and relying on, this 
indeterministic intellectual and social climate. We the heirs of 
chance and probability can indeed hardly make sense of the 
modern – let alone the ancient – mindset of certainty and au-
thority, if not derogatorily. For sure we still sometimes crave 
for stable enough rules and feasible plans, but always against 
a background of mobile hypotheses and risky assumptions. 
The very notions of possibility and novelty lie at the very 
heart of our scientific and artistic pursuits alike. Variables 
took the place of invariances, as we started to conceive and 
account for reality – brute or social alike – as something to 
cope with rather than to copy – where the latter activity is 
itself a function of our practical attitude and interests. Des-
cartes’s quest for certainty (and, well before it, Plato’s dupli-
cation of worlds) is now conceived as a deceiving answer to a 
misguided problem: that of reconciling necessity with contin-
gency. If necessity as certainty goes, all we are left with are 
ways of making the best of contingency as mobility. Between 
Descartes and us, in a period that culminates in the late nine-
teenth century of Darwin and Nietzsche, chance had stabi-
lized as the very practical tool with which distributing 
meanings, values, and truths. Further revolutions in technol-
ogy, imagination, and ways of living together fostered ever 
new ways of making sense of our individual and communal 
practices without transcendental banisters or fixed rails, ad-
justing our expectations and provisions of a future yet to be 
fully written and still entirely within the reach of our best 
hopes. 
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4. I have been presenting the so-called probabilistic revolu-
tion as the wider context through which we can begin to un-
derstand the shifting sands of the moralities and 
epistemologies of selfhood in late nineteenth-century Ameri-
ca, of which James offered a particularly strong version: the 
very moralities and epistemologies we have been furthering 
ever since by adjusting them to our most pressing contempo-
rary needs. James provides an exemplary case study of how 
we first came to terms with the specifically moral problematic 
of probability, with which we are still very much struggling. 
James’s entire philosophical vision, from his functionalistic 
psychology to his pragmatist conception of truth to his exhor-
tative ethics, can in fact be seen as a positive response to 
chance, possibility, and probability, which are part of the 
broader shift in sensibility concerning the very viability of the 
project of living with doubt and uncertainty.  
In a late account of his overall philosophical outlook, 
summing up the main features of his individualistic philoso-
phy, James explicitly relates novelty and activity with a dem-
ocratic form of individualism. He writes: 
This then is the individualist view… 
It means many good things: e.g. 
Genuine novelty 
order being won, paid for. 
the smaller system the truer 
man [is greater than] home [is greater than] state or church. 
anti-slavery in all ways 
toleration – respect for others 
democracy – good systems can always be described in individu-
alistic terms. 
hero-worship and custom. (James 1975a, 285) 
By emphasizing novelty and the need to win order and pay 
for it, James works out a conception of freedom midst uncer-
tainty as the work of self-transformation. This conception of-
fers an alternative to standard modern accounts of freedom 
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as autonomous self-legislation. This alternative understand-
ing of freedom involves a focus on our practices or acts of 
freedom as an unbroken work on the self as opposed to the 
emphasis on the capacity for freedom construed as giving the 
law to oneself of Lockean and Kantian heritage. James’s al-
ternative, I contend, is a resource for us today insofar as we 
are still learning how to negotiate lives of probabilities, 
chances, and indeterminacies after the demise of certainty. 
Freedom as self-transformation avoids some of the more 
puzzling and contentious implications of the idea of self-
legislation having to do with transcendental and metaphysi-
cal questions concerning the very possibility of self-sufficient, 
self-mastering subjects, apparently nowhere to be found in a 
secular, disenchanted world. Once we give up the philosoph-
ical mindset and scientific and cultural framework according 
to which the goal of individual and communal life is that of 
placing one’s thoughts, words, and deeds against a non-
human, certain as well as ideal reality in order to make sense 
of them and of ourselves, what we are left with is the open-
ended task of reweaving such strings of thought, language, 
and conduct from the very contingent and mobile place we 
presently occupy, with further actual or fictionalized ones 
possibly available5. The quest for certainty made sense in the 
modern historical and intellectual context, where it was in-
deed a live option, while it turned unproductive and hence 
uninteresting with the probabilistic revolution which turned 
our philosophical and ordinary lives upside down. We find 
no pessimism in James, though, as he saw this passage as an 
injection of energy and opening up of possibilities in our 
ways of being free and giving our activities meaning. What 
was indeed problematic, for James, was exactly our being 
stuck in a modern, static conception of the self and its moral 
duties, which lead to the very petrification of our truths and 
values. A pragmatist, mobile account of freedom as self-
transformation would have given individuals the moral force 
                                                 
5
 This thread has been most profitably and imaginatively taken on and 
furthered by Richard Rorty, who took James’s shift (and Dewey’s) from 
certainty to contingency at the heart of his own pragmatist project. For a 
classical reference, see Rorty 1989. 
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to rethink and remake themselves otherwise for the sake of 
melioration.  
James thought of freedom in terms of energy, effort, and 
what the vernacular of his day often referred to as the strenu-
ous attitude: “the pragmatism or pluralism which I defend”, 
he wrote, “has to fall back on a certain ultimate hardihood, a 
certain willingness to live without assurances or guarantees” 
(James 1975b, 124). For James, the strenuous life was about 
the flexibility of the self in the face of practical necessity, not 
the power of the self over a weaker or stronger fixed external 
reality. The greatest challenge to ourselves is always our very 
self, such that what we find in the most strenuous moments 
of our lives is not the power of our self against something 
other than itself, but rather the effort of our will against our 
entrenched habits:  
We forget that every good that is worth possessing must be paid 
for in strokes of daily effort. We postpone and postpone, until 
those smiling possibilities are dead. […] By neglecting the nec-
essary concrete labor, by sparing ourselves the little daily tax, 
we are positively digging the graves of our higher possibilities. 
According as a function receives daily exercise or not, the man 
becomes a different kind of being in later life. (James 1978d, 51) 
James reinforces this picture by praising 
[the] zone of insecurity in human affairs in which all the dra-
matic interest lies; the rest belongs to the dead machinery of the 
stage. This is the formative zone, the part not yet ingrained into 
the race’s average, not yet a typical, hereditary, and constant 
factor of the social community in which it occurs. (James 1978b, 
192)  
This willingness to live courageously in the absence of certi-
tudes and assurances as opposed to the discouragement inci-
dental to fixities and closure is for James the signature mark 
of the pragmatic temperament, which he encourages us to 
explore in conduct and reaffirm in strokes of daily effort: 
The zone of the individual differences, and of the social 'twists' 
which by common confession they initiate, is the zone of forma-
tive processes, the dynamic belt of quivering uncertainty, the 
line where past and future meet. It is the theatre of all we do not 
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take for granted, the stage of the living drama of life; and how-
ever narrow its scope, it is roomy enough to lodge the whole 
range of human passions. The sphere of the race's average, on 
the contrary, no matter how large it may be, is a dead and stag-
nant thing, an achieved possession, from which all insecurity 
has vanished. Like the trunk of a tree, it has been built up by 
successive concretions of successive active zones. The moving 
present in which we live with its problems and passions, its in-
dividual rivalries, victories, and defeats, will soon pass over to 
the majority and leave its small deposit on this static mass, to 
make room for fresh actors and a newer play. (James 1978b, 193) 
Now, the willful mobilization and transformation of our ha-
bitual stratifications, it has to be noticed, is not a mysterious 
power inbuilt in our nature, but rather a functional name for 
the effort of attention we bring to bear when we attend to the 
reworking of our own habits of thought, speech, and conduct. 
In this context, a notion of liberty worth the name would then 
have to be experimental, practical, and mobile rather than 
transcendental, fixed, and metaphysical. James looked to-
ward situations where we meet our limits to exhort us to not 
be debilitated where all we have as a basis for our action is 
the slimmest of probabilities. For James, acting on probabili-
ties involves resolving oneself to act with confidence where 
no certainty is to be found nor hoped for. This meant, for 
James, emancipating decision from certitude. Without either 
guarantee or insurance, still we go on acting with won or re-
newed confidence. James affirmed new forms of agency 
whereby we can transform ourselves midst uncertain condi-
tions. He sought to embrace the new realities of chance in 
which he took himself to be living. In these new conditions, 
“the world we practically live” (James 1975a, 140) is not 
something metaphysically given, but rather a chance for self-
transformation itself.  
 
5. In closing, the Jamesian conception of freedom as self-
transformation I briefly depicted guarantees no metaphysical 
grounding for the ethical life, but rather the other way 
around. It is because we come to morally react in such mobile 
and meliorative ways to the world, that we reshape its meta-
physical substance – if any. It is not that the world has 
changed from the modern to the contemporary times, but 
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rather that, via reconfiguration in scientific, technological, 
and cultural practices, new spaces for moral thinking and 
practice opened up and fostered us to respond accordingly in 
an unbroken exercise in meaningful self-transformation. It 
might well be that it will come a time in which invariances 
will become actual and pressing concerns again – and we do 
unfortunately have some signs of such backward-looking 
attitude in our current politics –, and yet those won’t be so 
many changes in the essence of the world but rather shifts in 
our ways of dealing with it. Jamesian liberalism tells the story 
of our individual and communal coming to maturity, where 
what has been given up as obsolete is a conception of the 
world and the self as inhospitable to chance, variance, and 
transformation.  
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